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THOSE JAPANESE FIRMS WITH THEIR
DISDAIN FOR SHAREHOLDERS: ANOTHER
FABLE FOR THE ACADEMY*
STEVEN N. KAPLAN**
J. MARK RAMSEYER"
I. INTRODUCTION
We have not lacked in the academy for tales about the way real behavior
fails to track basic economic theory: how real markets fail disastrously, how
real people act irrationally, or how real firms plan short-sightedly. Until
Steven N.S. Cheung studied Washington bees, the market's failure to
internalize the pollination externalities to honey production was one such
tale.' Until Ronald H. Coase studied coastal navigation aids, the market's
failure to provide lighthouses was another.2 Given the current fascination
with matters Japanese, the market's apparent failure to force Japanese
managers to maximize shareholder welfare is a strong third. Should anyone
brazenly suggest, based on standard economic theory, that firms facing
competitive product and capital markets should maximize shareholder
returns or vanish, all too often the orthodox response has been "Look at
Japan. You need new theory."
Orthodox observers argue that economic theory misses Japanese corporate
behavior because it ignores the historically contingent constraints on
entrepreneurial choice. Restated, they argue path-dependence: Economic
theory purports to predict how firms will operate but predicts from an
ideational and cultural vacuum. Because real firms operate within ideational
and cultural constraints that reflect the idiosyncratic paths by which their
societies reached the present, economic theory can not explain data from real
firms. Ergo, we need new theory.
All of this, we suggest, is yet another case of bad empirics driving
* The authors received generous comments and suggestions from Richard Epstein, Dan
Fischel, Beth Garrett, Dennis Kariala, Bill Klein, Dan Klerman, John Lott, Curtis Milhaupt, and Hugh
Patrick.
** Professor of Business, University of Chicago.
*** Professor of Law, University of Chicago. Ramseyer acknowledges the generous financial
assistance of the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation and the Sarah Scaife Foundation.
1. Steven N.S. Cheung, The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation, 16 J.L. & EcON. 11
(1973).
2. R.H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON. 357 (1974).
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needlessly complicated theory. That firms may operate within constraints
that reflect idiosyncratic past choices is true. But in understanding the basic
contours of the Japanese economy, it is often only trivially true-for in
many ways it is largely irrelevant. Notwithstanding the usual accounts to the
contrary, Japanese executives do face incentives to maximize profits. Those
who fail risk losing income or even their jobs. Basic economic theory may
be simple, but it also predicts basic Japanese firm behavior. The elaborate
arguments about path dependence notwithstanding, on matters that implicate
large amounts of money but not regulatory restrictions, competitive markets
largely have no history.
We begin in Section II by discussing the modem theory of path
dependence. In Section III, we trace the ties between that theory and the
orthodox understanding of how Japanese firms behave. Then in Section IV,
we report Steven Kaplan's recent empirical work on the actual behavior of
Japanese firms. Finally, armed with the empirical results that contradict the
orthodox view, in Section V we suggest how that view may have arisen.
II. PATH DEPENDENCE
Obviously, history can matter. Individually, the choices we make today
can affect the returns we earn tomorrow. The mistakes we make today can
limit the choices we have tomorrow. Collectively, too, the choices and
mistakes we make today can determine, sometimes decisively, the future we
face tomorrow. Sometimes, as economic historian Paul A. David put it, we
cannot "uncover the logic (or illogic) of the world around us except by
understanding how it got that way."3
But, just as obviously, history does not always matter. Some choices can
make little difference, and some mistakes can easily be unmade. At root,
how completely past choices bind us is an empirical question. On the one
hand, Nobel Laureate Douglass C. North posits the "peculiar fact that
incremental changes in technology, once begun on a particular track, may
lead one technological solution to win out over another . .. ." Crucially,
claims North, a solution may win out even when "this technological path
may be less efficient than the abandoned alternative would have been.'" 5
Even in competitive markets without binding regulatory restrictions, even
when everyone could improve his or her lot by switching technologies,
3. Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 332, 332 (May
1985).
4. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 93 (1990) (emphasis added).
5. Id.
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coordination problems and information costs can prevent people from
abandoning inferior technologies.
One would do well to be skeptical. Clearly, inefficient lock-in can occur.
By positing appropriate transactions costs, network externalities, and scale
economies, one can easily prove that lock-in is possible.6 Yet that it is
possible does not in a competitive market make it probable. In such a
market, an entrenched inefficient technology is potentially a twenty-dollar
bill lying on the sidewalk. An entrepreneur who introduces a better
technology stands to make good money. Even if he or she cannot introduce
it through spot-market deals, he or she may yet be able to do so with a little
institutional creativity.
7
Moreover, to date most scholars who argue that inefficient path-
dependence is widespread in competitive markets cite only anecdotes. And
most of their tales-whether claims about the Dvorak keyboard and Beta
video or Thorstein Veblen's account of the 19th century British coal cars-
have been proven false.8 Upon examination, others have shown that the
supposedly inferior technologies were not inferior at all.
At least implicitly, many contemporary students of comparative corporate
governance seem to be walking the same path-dependent plank. They argue
that corporations operating in different economies govern themselves in
radically different ways. Those different corporate governance systems, in
turn, reflect their different social contexts. And those different contexts
reflect the diverse histories by which their respective economies reached the
present. Even when a corporate governance regime is inefficient, path-
dependent lock-in prevents firms from adopting more efficient regimes.
III. JAPANESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Consider the U.S.-Japan comparison. In a recent article, Harvard Business
6. See, e.g., W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-in by
Historical Events, 99 EcON. J. 116 (1989); Robin Cowan, Tortoises and Hares: Choice Among
Technologies of Unknown Merit, I01 ECON. J. 801 (1991); Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standard-
ization, Compatibility, and Innovation, RAND J. EcoN., Spring 1985, at 70; Michael L. Katz & Carl
Shapiro, Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities, 94 J. POL. EcoN. 822 (1986).
7. See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 205,224 (1995).
8. See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, 8 J.
ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Fall 1994, at 133 (video players); SJ. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The
Fable of the Keys, 33 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1990) (Dvorak keyboards); Va Nee L. Van Vleck, Reassessing
Technological Backwardness: Absolving the "Silly Little Bobtailed" Coal Car, 55 J. ECON. HIST. 383
(1995) (British coal cars).
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School professor Michael E. Porter nicely captured the usual stereotypes.9
American institutional investors, he wrote, impose goals that "are purely
financial and are focused on quarterly or annual appreciation of their
investment portfolio."' 0 Those stock market measures, he implied, often
miss a fimn's long-term prospects.
In contrast to their American counterparts, Porter continued, Japanese
owners look to the "long-term."" As a result, for senior Japanese executives
"current earnings or share prices play only a modest role in promotion or
compensation."' 2 For them, stock prices "have virtually no direct or indirect
influence."' 3
Porter did not invent this tale. It is a staple of the popular press and comes
with a long academic pedigree. As early as the 1970s, sociologist Rodney
Clark concluded that for Japanese firms, "high profitability, a large return on
assets or capital employed, is unlikely to be a very important goal."'14
Instead, Japanese firms pursue "aims which are given rather lower priority in
the West, such as the provision of welfare to employees."' 15 A few years later
business consultants James C. Abegglen and George Stalk, Jr., echoed the
claim: "[A] Japanese manager is able to look further into the future and is
freer to do what is necessary to ensure a successful future because of his
greater job security."'16 Ultimately, argued Abegglen and Stalk, Japanese
managers "are freed from the tyranny of accountants, and from the terrible
pressures throughout the U.S. organizations for steady improvement in
earnings per share."' 7 According to sociologist Ronald Dore, "even in
practical terms, Japanese managers do not have to be too worried about their
share price."' 8 By 1992, even prominent economists Paul Milgrom and John
Roberts could flatly declare that Japanese firms, impliedly in contrast to
those in the United States, "are not run in the interests of their
shareholders."' 9
9. Michael E. Porter, Capital Disadvantage: America's Failing Capital Investment System,
HARv. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 65.
10. Id. at 70.
11. Porter, supra note 9, at 70.
12. Id. at 72.
13. Id. at 71.
14. RODNEY CLARK, THEJAPANESE COMPANY 136 (1979) (original emphasis omitted).
15. Id. at 137.
16. JAMES C. ABEGGLEN & GEORGE STALK, JR., KAISHA: THE JAPANESE CORPORATION 188
(1985).
17. Id.
18. RONALD DORE, TAKING JAPAN SERIOUSLY: A CONFUCIAN PERSPECTIVE ON LEADING
ECONOMIC ISSUES 117 (1987).
19. PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 443
(1992).
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Observers often explain these corporate governance "facts" through path-
dependence.20 According again to Porter, American firms find themselves
caught in a coordination trap. Although all players-owners, managers,
employees, and community members-would prefer to adopt a longer term
perspective, no one can profitably switch alone. "[B]y focusing on long-term
corporate position and creating an ownership structure and governance
process that incorporate the interests of employees, suppliers, customers, and
the local community, the Japanese ... system[] better capture[s] the social
benefits that private investment can create."21 Nonetheless, change takes
cooperation and cooperation takes coordination. "Each group [in the United
States] is behaving rationally," Porter concludes, "given the current
circumstances. All are trapped in a system that ultimately serves the interests
of no one. Each is pursuing its own narrow goals within the system-but the
goals operate at cross-purposes. 22 The logic here involves three
propositions: (1) the stock market does not accurately reflect a firm's
prospects; (2) only by overcoming serious coordination problems can a firm
ignore these misleading stock-market cues; and (3) those coordination
problems are historically contingent.
Plausible reasons for at least coordination problems are not impossible to
imagine.23 For example, suppose American corporate governance depends
both on corporate control markets and on high mobility for senior
executives. Perhaps no Japanese firm could unilaterally shift to the
American system because takeovers are rare in Japan and an active
managerial labor market does not yet exist.24 Suppose Japanese governance
20. Not all do. Some (like Mark Roe) do use path-dependency terminology, but in fact hinge
their argument (much more plausibly) on political and regulatory constraints. Roe makes this
regulatory argument elegantly in MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL
ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994). For a subtle analysis that places relational
cooperation within legal constraints, see Curtis J. Milhaupt, A Relational Theory of Japanese
Corporate Governance: Contract, Culture, and the Rule of Law, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J (forthcoming
1996).
21. Porter, supra note 9, at 75.
22. Id. at 76.
23. Insightful variations include MASAHIKO AOKI, INFORMATION, INCENTIVES, AND
BARGAINING IN THE JAPANESE ECONOMY (1988); MICHAEL L. GERLACH, ALLIANCE CAPITALISM:
THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF JAPANESE BUSINESS 246-70 (1992); Milhaupt, supra note 20.
24. See generally W. CARL KESTER, JAPANESE TAKEOVERS: THE GLOBAL CONTEST FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL (1991); J. Mark Ramseyer, Takeovers in Japan: Opportunism, Ideology and
Corporate Control, 35 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1987). Indeed, given the importance of firm-specific skills in
Japan, those who do try to shift jobs would suffer a large loss in pay. See Takao Kato & Mark Rockel,
Experiences, Credentials, and Compensation in the Japanese and US. Managerial Labor Markets:
Evidencefrom New Micro Data, 6 J. JAPANESE & INT'L ECO. 52 (1992).
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depends on banks and affiliated firms actively monitoring each other.25
Perhaps no American firm could unilaterally shift to the Japanese system
because those alternative monitoring institutions are not in place.
And yet, this easy application of path-dependence to corporate gover-
nance misses something essential about economic performance. Wholly
aside from managerial labor markets, corporate control markets, and
relational monitoring schemes, firms face the basic logic of product and
capital markets. Unless a firm produces good products cheaply, few will buy
its goods. Unless it makes a market return on its investments, few will lend it
money or buy its stock. Unless shareholders price stock in light of a firm's
long-term prospects, they throw money away. According to economic
theory, absent binding regulatory constraints these several factors should
ultimately drive managers to maximize long-term prospects and-
necessarily and simultaneously-share price. If they do, then (i) inefficient
governance systems will be both rarer and more transient in market
economies than most accounts of comparative corporate governance
suggest; and (ii) corporate governance regimes will diverge in market
economics (absent, again, binding regulatory constraints) only on points that
do not much matter.
We are all Aristotelians or Platonists, someone once said somewhere, and
most economists are the latter. We either start with data and generalize to
theory or start with theory and explore for data, and most economists do the
latter. Despite the massive work academics have done on Japan (in truth,
perhaps because of it), Japan remains every Aristotelian's treasure trove of
anti-economic anecdotes. It is a trove with an enormous array of corporate
governance tales. Consistently, they confirm the Aristotelian dream:
Disembodied economic theory misses real-world behavior. If standard
economic theory suggests managers maximize stock price, by almost every
anecdote from Japan, they never do. Reality is contextual, the anecdotes
instead insist. And theory invented to explain firms in the West will never
explain those in the East, for what drives firms necessarily depends on the-
historically contingent-social networks and symbolic webs within which
shareholders hold shares, managers manage, and ordinary people live out
their ordinary lives.
25. A point for which there is considerable evidence, both in this study, see infra section IV.B.2.,
and in excellent studies elsewhere: E.g., THE JAPANESE MAIN BANK SYSTEM: ITS RELEVANCE FOR
DEVELOPING AND TRANSFORMING ECONOMIES (Masahiko Aoki & Hugh Patrick eds., 1994); Takeo
Hoshi, Anil Kashyap & David Scharfstein, Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment: Evidence
from Japanese Industrial Groups, 106 Q.J. ECON. 33 (1991); Stephen D. Prowse, The Structure of
Corporate Ownership in Japan, 47 J. FIN. 1121 (1992); Paul Sheard, The Main Bank System and
Corporate Monitoring and Control in Japan, 11 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORO. 399 (1989).
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But the anecdotes are wrong.
IV. THE EVIDENCE FROM JAPAN
A. Introduction
1. The studies
To explore what drives the way Japanese firms behave, we ask three
questions: (1) when do outsiders join the board of directors in a Japanese
firm (section B); (2) when do senior executives lose their jobs (section C);
and (3) what determines how much board members make (section D)? To
answer these questions, we introduce several recent empirical studies by
Steve Kaplan.26 In the discussion below, we summarize the results in a more
accessible form and discuss their implications-both for how we should
understand Japan specifically, and for how we should understand the
allegedly path-dependent character of corporate governance more generally.
The Japanese companies involved are the 119 publicly held Japanese
companies that Fortune magazine listed among the 500 largest foreign
industrials in 1980.27 For these firms, Kaplan collected financial, employ-
ment, stock price, shareholding, executive, and board data for 1980-88. For
comparison, we also occasionally report comparable figures from American
firms in the 1980 Fortune listings.
Of the Japanese firms, most were part of an affiliated group, a keiretsu:
65% were in a bank keiretsu and 17% in a non-bank keiretsu.28 Within each
firm, the top ten shareholders held a mean of 40% of the stock. Only 2.5% of
the firms (21.9% for corresponding American firms) were the target of a
takeover or subject to a merger during 1980-88.
26. One study was co-authored by Bernadette Minton. See Steven N. Kaplan, Top Executive
Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the United States, 102 J. POL. ECON.
510 (1994); Steven N. Kapan, Top Executives, Turnover, and Firm Performance in Germany, 10 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 142 (1994); Steven N. Kaplan & Bernadette A. Minton, Appointments of Outsiders to
Japanese Boards: Determinants and Implicationsfor Managers, 36 J. FIN. ECON. 225 (1994). Because
Kaplan has already presented the technical econometrics in these specialty journals, we refer interested
readers there for the statistical detail.
27. Andrea Ball & Edward Boyer, The Fortune Directory of the Largest Industrial Corporations
Outside the United States, FORTUNE, Aug. 11, 1980 at 188.
28. Bank keiretsu are those centered around banks (e.g., the Mitsubishi group). Non-bank
keiretsu are those centered around industrial firms (e.g., the Toyota group).
1996] 409
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2. The institutional environment
By law, Japanese directors jointly decide corporate strategy.29 For day to
day operations, however, they employ officers who in turn hire subordinates.
The shareholders elect these directors at their annual meeting and assign
them terms of up to two years.30 To remove them, shareholders with at least
three percent of the stock may call a special meeting.3 1
The firms in Kaplan's study had a median of twenty-one directors (the
American firms had a median of fifteen). Unlike American directors, most if
not all of the directors of Japanese firms were company executives.
Typically, they served on the board for about eight years. Each board
included a president who generally functioned as the chief
executiveofficer.32 In each firm, the top executives (a median of 3 and a
mean of 4.2 individuals) served as "representative directors." 33 As such, they
had the authority to act on behalf of the firm in assorted important matters.
Generally, they wielded significant power.
We call directors "outside directors" if they ever worked for another
firm.34 if they came to the firm from a bank, we call them "bank directors,"
and if they came from an outside firm other than a bank we call them "non-
bank directors." Over the period studied, the firms selected one bank outside
director in 7.5% of the firm-years, and a non-bank outside director in 5.9%
of the firm-years. Upon appointment, outsiders served about as long as
insiders.
B. Board Turnover
1. Appointment of outsiders
To determine what induced firms to appoint outside directors, we
considered four possible performance measures:
(a) shareholder returns (dividends plus capital gains);
29. SHOHO [Commercial Code], Law No. 48 of 1899, § 260.
30. Id. §§ 254,256.
31. Id. §§237,257.
32. Sometimes, however, the chairman of the board had more power and influence.
33. Id. § 261.
34. Directors with prior appointments in government are excluded, on the grounds that these
"amakudari posts" signify very different events. See generally J. MARK RAMSEYER & FRANCES
MCCALL ROSENBLUTH, JAPAN'S POLITICAL MARKETPLACE ch. 6 (1993). Firms hired a former
government official in 5.5% of the firm-years.
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https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol74/iss2/6
1996] JAPANESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 411
(b) sales growth (an obviously rough proxy for change in market share);
(c) income change (the change in pre-tax income as a fraction of total firm
assets); and
(d) whether income is negative.35
Appointments of outside directors increased significantly when returns fell
(measure (a)) or income became negative (measure (d)), but were not
correlated with either sales growth (measure (b)) or income change (measure
(c)). Consider the implications. First and most obviously, stock price
matters. When stock prices fall, firms appoint outside directors, both bank
and shareholder outsiders. Figure 1 illustrates this point by showing that a
50% differential or decline in stock returns roughly doubles the likelihood
that an outsider will be appointed to the board from 12.9% to 22.8%.36
Indeed, outside appointments in Japan are more sensitive to stock price than
in the United States.
Figure 1
Outside appointments and stock returns in Japan
Poor versus normal performance is 50% stock return differential
Zci 5 22.8
0
4. 105
00
o 5
-4 0
Normal Poor
performance performance
35. The measure takes the value of zero ifpre-tax income is positive, and one if pre-tax income is
negative. As such, it allows one to test theories suggesting that Japanese firms encounter external
monitoring if, but only if, they start to lose money.
36. We report the increased likelihood of an outside appointment when stock returns are 50%
lower. The 50% differential is used here and throughout the paper for illustrative purposes. It
represents approximately a two standard deviation difference in performance. In fact, the statistical
analysis implies that the likelihood of an outside appointment (and, later in the paper, of executive
turnover) increases monotonically with poor stock performance.
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Second, an earnings loss matters. If a Japanese firm loses money, Figure 2
shows that the chance that the firm will appoint an outside director in either
that year or the next year doubles-from 12.9% to 26.1%. Interestingly, the
coefficients for a loss are significant for bank directors but not for non-bank
outside directors. A loss, of course, bears directly on whether a firm can
meet obligations to its bank.
Figure 2
Outside appointments and earnings losses in Japan
30
26.125 -
g-20 i
" 150 12.9
0
0 10-
0
5-
0
Positive Income Income Loss
Third, sales growth has no significant impact on outside appointments.
Changes in sales-a proxy for a firm's market share-do not affect the
possibility that a firm will appoint outsiders.
Holding performance constant, firms are also more likely to appoint bank
directors after they have borrowed the most (relative to their size), and when
they have obtained those borrowings from a single lender. They are more
likely to appoint non-bank (shareholder) directors when their shareholdings
are concentrated and when they are part of a keiretsu. More simply, bankers
join the board when a bank has a large loan to protect, and non-bank
outsiders join when a few shareholders have large investments to protect.
2. Appointments of outsiders and internal change
Some readers may question whether adding an outsider to a board matters.
After all, an outsider is only one person on a board of aproximately twenty
people. Perhaps, however, in representing a bank or a large shareholder, the
outsider wields a great deal of power. Kaplan tested this by considering what
[VOL. 74:403
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happened to important incumbent directors (i.e., senior managers) in years
that an outsider was appointed to the board. The results show that the
appointment of an outside director strongly indicates that major changes are
about to occur. Consider four measures of internal change:
(i) the turnover of the president;
(ii) the non-standard turnover of the president (the old president leaves and
does not become chairman, something that happens about 30% of the time that
a president loses his37 job);
(iii) the percentage turnover of the representative directors; and
(iv) the percentage turnover of all of the directors.
As Table 1 shows, once a firm appoints an outsider to its board, the
probability of each type of internal change increases substantially.
Table 1: Likelihood of Major Internal Changes,
Given Outside Board Appointments
Years w/o Years w/
outside appt outside appt
Presidential turnover 15.1% 24.9%
Non-standard presidential turnover 3.9 11.1
Representative director turnover 14.4 24.5
All director turnover 12.1 16.3
These increases do not just capture the fact that firms appoint outside
directors when they perform poorly (after all, bad performance itself
increases executive turnover).38 Even holding firn performance constant,
outside appointments correlate with increased senior personnel turnover.
The point is basic: a firm's banks and shareholders care about the firm's
performance. They do not lend money and buy stock just to cement
relationships. Rather, banks and shareholders appear to demand performance
and intervene if they do not obtain it. Upon intervening, they take seats on
the board and fire senior managers.
C. Executive Turnover
Now ask whether the turnover of senior executives is directly sensitive
(independent of the outside board appointments) to any of the same
performance measures: (a) stock returns, (b) sales growth, (c) income
37. All Japanese executives in these studies were male.
38. See Part IV. C, infra.
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change, and (d) whether income is negative. Turn first to presidents and then
to representative directors.
1. Presidents
Japanese presidents have a median age of sixty-six (fifty-nine for
American CEOs). They have worked in their firms for a median of thirty-
nine years (twenty-eight years for American CEOs), and serve as president
for an average of 6.7 years (9.7 years for American CEOs). When a
president leaves his job, 68.5% of the time he becomes chairman of the
board. As in Section B, if a president becomes chairman, we call it "standard
turnover"; if he does not, we call it "non-standard." 39 We will consider each
separately.
Standard presidential turnover is not significantly related to any of the
four performance variables. When presidents step down to become
chairman, they tend to do so because they have served the typical four to
eight years, not because their firm experienced poor performance during
their tenure.
Non-standard presidential turnover, by contrast, is significantly related to
share price (measure (a)), income change (measure (c)), and whether income
is negative (measure (d))-but not to sales (measure (b)).40 Suppose a firm's
stock price underperforms the market by fifty percent. The odds that its
president will lose his job and not become chairman increase from 3.5% to
8.5%. Or suppose that the firm has a loss. The odds jump by about 9% from
3.5% to 12.5%. For presidential tenure as for outside appointments, stock
price and profits matter.4 1
2. Representative directors
The turnover of representative directors is significantly related to all four
performance measures. Again, suppose a firm's stock price underperforms
the market by fifty percent. The statistical analysis implies that the turnover
of its representative directors will increase from 14.3% to 18.9%. Or suppose
the firm reports a loss. Turnover jumps from 14.3% to 25.3%.42
39. Turnovers caused by death, illness, or takeover are treated as missing observations.
40. In the United States presidential turnover is significantly related to all four measures.
41. When all four performance measures are regressed together against turnover, only the
coefficient on whether income is negative was statistically significant.
42. When all four performance measures are regressed together against representative director
turnover, only the coefficients on stock return and sales growth were statistically significant.
[VOL. 74:403
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Once more, readers may ask whether those increases in turnover are
meaningful. After all, even in very bad years the majority of representative
directors keep their jobs. Perhaps the best way to consider this is to compare
what happens to representative directors in Japan with what happens to
executive directors in the United States. Figures 3 and 4 indicate that the
effects are qualitatively identical. Turnover in the United States increases
with poor performance by roughly the same amount as in Japan. In other
words, poor stock and earnings performance has roughly the same impact
(or lack of impact) on top executives in Japan as on top executives in the
United States.
Figure 3
Top Executive Turnover and Stock Return
20 Poor versus normal performance is 50% stock return differential
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Figure 4
Top Executive Turnover and Negative Income
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D. Senior Management Compensation
Consider now the determinants of executive compensation. More
particularly, ask whether-as orthodox observers claim-compensation
practices in Japan give senior personnel an incentive to govern the firm in
ways that emphasize market share over profitability and stock price.
Consistent with the earlier discussion, the answer is a flat no. We again used
the four performance measures and traced their effect on the cash
compensation of Japanese directors, generally, the senior-most executives.
The compensation of Japanese directors is significantly related to all four
performance variables. The performance measure that explains the most
variation in the data43 is whether the firm made a profit. The measure that
explains the least is sales growth. For example, a fifty percent increase in
stock returns leads to director pay increases totaling more than 9% (over the
following two years). A director of a firm that reports a loss can expect to
see his pay cut by 13%.
Again, what happens in Japan is not aberrational. In fact, it closely
resembles the experience in the United States. Figures 5 and 6 illustrate this
comparison by comparing the effect of stock returns, sales growth, and
earnings losses on the cash compensation of Japanese directors and
American CEOs.
Figure 5
Top Executive Compensation and Performance
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43. .e., the measure yielding the highest R2 in the regressions.
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Figure 6
Top Executive Compensation After Earnings Loss
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V. THE (MISTAKEN) SOURCE OF THE ORTHODOX VIEW
How could the orthodox view arise, despite its strong rejection in the
data? We conjecture that timing-ironically enough, academic "path
dependence"-played a perverse trick on students of Japanese firms.
Most orthodox observers based their conclusions about Japanese firms on
what those firms did during the 1960s, 70s, and 80s. Those were decades of
tremendous growth and success. It seems plausible, if not likely, that the
value maximizing strategy for most Japanese firms during the period was to
grow as fast as possible. Many of their investments probably had large
payoffs in the longer-term. Because the advisability of rapid growth for
many American firms ended with the 1960s, 4 the successful, well-known
Japanese firms would have seemed quite different from the well-known
American firms.
The advantage of Kaplan's large-scale studies is that they consider not
only successful firms but also unsuccessful Japanese firms in the 1980s. It is
those unsuccessful firms that exhibit the behavior we associate with
American firms. Executives of those firms are more likely to lose their jobs
and are paid less.
Unconvinced readers need only consider the behavior of Japanese firms in
the 1990s. Although we have only anecdotal accounts of their behavior, the
anecdotes are very different from the old ones, but completely consistent
44. See Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal
Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831 (1993).
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with the data above. With the depressed economic conditions in Japan in the
1990s, Japanese firms have cut back on investment and have reduced
employment, albeit through retirement and reduced hiring rather than
through firings.45 Most recently, even Sony, one of the best-known
companies in Japan, fired its top entertainment executive Mickey Schulhof
for poor earnings performance.46
VI. CONCLUSION
Observers have long argued that Japanese managers ignore stock prices
and immediate profits. From that factual premise, they urge a variety of
complex theoretical permutations. Some propose theories that place markets
and firms within their idiosyncratic social and cultural contexts. Others urge
theories that account for the particular paths by which those markets and
firms reached the present.
The truth is simpler-for when large amounts of money are at stake
competitive markets know no history. To explore the purported path
dependence of corporate governance, we reported the results of several
large-scale econometric studies of Japanese and American firms. According
to the data, Japanese firms do indeed give their managers incentives to
maximize share price: Those that do live well, while those that do not earn
less and may even find themselves without their jobs and the status that
those jobs confer. We do not ignore the scores of dissertations, articles, and
books on Japan to the contrary. We merely observe that they are wrong.
Once again, needlessly complicated theory has been chasing demonstrably
untrue facts.
45. See, e.g., Joshua Ogawa, Nf Job Cuts Hit as More Politics Than Economics:
'Restructuring' Plan Reduces Odds of Breakup, NIKKEI WKLY., Nov. 13, 1995, at I (reporting that
Nippon Telephone & Telegraph's plan to eliminate 45,000 jobs over the next five years will actually
result in no layoffs).
46. See James Bates & Claudia Eller, Sony Ousts Head of U.S. Operations, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 6,
1995, at Al.
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